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EDUCATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN FLORIDA:
MEANINGFUL REFORM OR MARGINAL TINKERING?
ANTHONY D. DEMMA, JR.
Of American education as it currently operates, we can say this: In
general, if you do well educating a group of students, nothing good
happens to you or for you. Similarly, if you do badly educating a
group of students, again nothing happens to you or for you. There
are greater, more certain, and more immediate penalties in this
country for serving up a single rotten hamburger in a restaurant than
for repeatedly furnishing a thousand children with a rotten
education.'
TfHESE words of former U.S. Secretary of Education William J.
Bennett accurately sum up the concerns of many Americans about
the current level of education accountability. Although educators, in-
terested commentators, and everyday citizens often disagree about the
extent of, causes for, and solutions to the decline of public education
in America, there is widespread agreement that schools must be held
accountable for their failures and rewarded for their successes. 2 Re-
formers bemoan continuing bureaucratic emphasis on "inputs" (i.e.,
dollars per student, number and types of programs in place) at the
expense of meaningful evaluations of actual educational outcomes fol-
lowed by strong corrective measures when needed.'
After a decade-long series of Presidential Commissions, Governors'
Conferences, and national studies, followed by rapid-fire enactment
of diverse reform plans and programs across the country, 4 a national
consensus still exists that public education needs to be revitalized if it
1. William J. Bennett, Address before Annual Meeting of the American Legislative Ex-
change Council (1988), quoted in DUANE A. PARDE, AM. LEGIs. EXCH. COUNCIL, SOURCE BOOK
OF AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATION 20 (1990).
2. Christopher T. Cross, Foreword to MICHAEL W. KIRST, ACCOUNTABILITY: IMPLICATIONS
FOR STATE AND LOCAL POICmA1ERS at iii (1990).
3. PARDE, supra note 1, at 2, 21-22.
4. See William A. Firestone et al., An Overview of Education Reform Since 1983, in THE
EDUCATION REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE 1980s: PERSPECTIVE AND CASES 349-50 (Joseph Murphy
ed., 1990).
1145
1146 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1145
is to help the nation meet the challenges of the next century.' Various
education accountability plans have been enacted in recent years
around the country in hopes of initiating that revitalization. 6 In Flor-
ida, legislators and educators have been wrestling with notions of ac-
countability since 1976, 7 yet there is little agreement about what it
means and how it can best be achieved. Nevertheless, Florida enacted
a school accountability law in 1991 called Blueprint 2000.8
To provide a better understanding of Blueprint 2000, this Comment
will examine the nature and dimensions of the national education cri-
sis, discuss theories that attempt to provide solutions to the crisis, re-
view solutions attempted by states other than Florida, and describe
the status of education in Florida and how Blueprint 2000 is designed
to improve the state's educational system.
I. THE CALL To ARMs
A. Status of Education Nationally
Educators and legislators tinkered with notions of accountability
throughout the 1970s because of the concern about declining test
scores. 9 However, the 1983 report of the National Commission on Ex-
cellence in Education, A Nation At Risk,10 triggered a tidal wave of
state policy activity in education.I' The commission expressed concern
about the deterioration of United States preeminence in commerce,
industry, science, and technology.' 2 The report noted the important
role of the public schools in maintaining our national security, and the
commission summarized its findings as follows:
If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America
the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might
well have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands, we have allowed
this to happen to ourselves. We have even squandered the gains in
5. For example, the National Governors' Association, the Carnegie Forum, and the Com-
mittees on Economic Development have called for a fundamental restructuring of the education
system. FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF POLICY RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, RESTRUCTURING
EDUCATION: WHAT IT MEANS FOR PRINCIPALS 1 (1989); see also LORRAnE M. MCDONNELL, RE-
STRUCTURING AMERICAN SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE AND THE PITFALLS 3 (ERIC Clearinghouse on
Urban Educ. No. 57 1989).
6. KmsT, supra note 2, at 1.
7. See FLA. STAT. § 229.55 (1991).
8. See Ch. 91-283, 1991 Fla. Laws 2727.
9. See KntsT, supra note 2, at 4.
10. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENcE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983) [hereinafter NATION AT RISK].
11. See KIRST, supra note 2, at 1, 4; Firestone, supra note 4, at 352 n.4.
12. NATION AT RISK, supra note 10, at 5.
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student achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge.
Moreover, we have dismantled essential support systems which
helped make those gains possible. We have, in effect, been
committing an act of unthinking, unilateral educational
disarmament.' 3
The commission found that American students had the lowest
scores on seven of nineteen academic tests when compared with stu-
dents from other industrialized nations. 14 American students were not
first or second in any area. 5 About 13% of all seventeen-year-olds
were functionally illiterate, including up to 40% of all minority
youth.16 Average academic achievement, based on most standardized
test measures, had fallen below 1957 levels, and Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT) scores had consistently declined since 1963, with verbal
scores declining more than fifty points and mathematics scores drop-
ping nearly forty points.' 7
The Commission's report marked the culmination of an eighteen-
month study.' 8 The commission ultimately concluded that the average
high school and college graduates of 1983 were not as well educated as
those of the 1950s and 1960s.' 9 In general, the report stated, the aver-
age curriculum had become seriously diluted and diffused by the in-
troduction of too many nonacademic courses. 20 Furthermore,
expectations for students were far too low, students spent too little
time engaged in academic activities, and teachers were underpaid and
often poorly qualified.2'
Some eight years after the commission released its findings, the
U.S. Department of Education released data from a national mathe-
matics test.22 The information revealed that 72% of fourth-graders
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 8-9.
Also, since 1963 more than half the nation's gifted students achieved less in school than their
tested abilities predicted. In that same period there was a dramatic decline in the proportion of
students making superior scores (650 or higher) on the SAT tests. Almost 40% of all 17-year-
olds were unable to draw inferences from written material; about 80% were unable to write a
persuasive essay. Science achievement scores on national tests given in 1969, 1973, and 1977
declined steadily. At the college level, the commission noted a 72% increase in remedial mathe-
matics courses from 1975 to 1980 and a decline in the average tested achievement among gradu-
ates. Id.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 11.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 18-23.
22. Math Skills Don't Add Up, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, June 7, 1991, at A10.
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could add and subtract, but only 14% of eighth-graders had achieved
seventh-grade skills. In the best-scoring states, only 25% of the
eighth-graders tested at grade level. Only 5% of the high school sen-
iors mastered algebra and geometry skills, and only 46% of the sen-
iors were able to perform eighth-grade skills. Predictably, students
from disadvantaged urban areas and those from the southeast re-
ceived the lowest scores. These and other academic indicators, espe-
cially the dismal international comparisons, point to the development
of a serious competitive disadvantage. 4
B. Reform Theories
Policymakers grappling with this data face complex choices as they
seek a more accountable school system. Education reform theorists
say there are different ways to achieve accountability and that it is
frequently preferable to combine elements of several strategies. 5 Ac-
countability efforts have often not met expectations because the plans
did not properly balance strategies. 26
Reform theorists often classify the academic excellence standards
and educational mandates of state and federal governments as Wave
One27 changes. These changes repair ailing school systems by making
educational standards tighter and by rewarding excellence.2 Wave
One reforms rely on measuring such factors as dollars per student and
achieving minimum standards. 29
23. Id.
24. Syndicated columnist George Will emphasized this point by saying:
Sixty-three percent of those ages 18 to 24 cannot find France on an unlabeled map
(fewer than half find New York); 60 percent of 11th graders do not know why the
Federalist Papers were written; 94 percent of I Ith graders cannot compute simple in-
terest; in tests comparing their math and science skills with those of five foreign coun-
tries and four Canadian provinces, American 13-year-olds finish last; New York
Telephone finds that 115,000 of 117,000 applicants flunk its employment exam; 80
percent of applicants flunk Motorola's exam seeking levels of 7th-grade English and
5th-grade math.
George Will, National Testing Could Only Improve State of Education, TALLAHASsEE DEMo-
CRAT, June 2, 1991, at B3.
25. KiRST, supra note 2, at 1, 10 (There are six distinct approaches: 1) accountability
through performance reporting; 2) accountability through compliance with standards; 3) ac-
countability through incentives; 4) accountability through market forces; 5) accountability
through changes in the locus of school control; and 6) accountability through alteration of pro-
fessional roles.); see also Firestone, supra note 4, at 361-62.
26. KIRST, supra note 2, at 10; see also LORRAINE M. McDoNNELL & RICHARD F. ELMORE,
ALTERNATIVE POLICY INSTRUMENTS 7 (1987).
27. KIRST, supra note 2, at 19; William L. Boyd, Balancing Control and Autonomy in
School Reform: The Politics of Perestroika, in THE EDUCATION REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE
1980s: PERSPECTIVE AND CASES 86-87 (Joseph Murphy ed., 1990).
28. Boyd, supra note 27, at 86.
29. Id.
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The failure of these reforms to bring about sufficient improvement
in academic performance has stimulated calls for more fundamental
structural changes in public education: Wave Two.30 These changes
typically seek to return a substantial degree of day-to-day decision-
making power to local authorities while maintaining some type of cen-
tralized control over core values and standards. Theorists call these
power shifts "restructuring." 3"
Wave Two reforms also seek to enhance student performance.3 2 The
means used, however, focus on shifting decision-making authority in-
stead of relying on top-down mandates establishing minimum stan-
dards.33 Making local schools accountable for academic excellence,
instead of just minimum skills, requires establishment of higher order
skill goals and the ability to accurately test for them.34 For example,
under Wave One, if legislators believe high school students should
pass chemistry in order to graduate, they simply mandate a require-
ment that assures some minimal exposure to the subject. Under Wave
Two, however, if they wish to promote a high degree of chemistry
achievement, they must explain their goals precisely and develop a sys-
tem of measurements to monitor goal attainment. 5 A viable statewide
accountability plan must have some degree of top-down requirements,
but these state-level decisions must be reasonable and workable.3 6
Policymakers must balance central authority and local autonomy if
they are to revitalize education. 37 For example, President George Bush
included both local autonomy (incentives for parental choice and in-
novative schools, as well as reduced bureaucratic mandates) and na-
tional core curriculum and tests in his national education reform
proposal. 38 The President, however, did not address the tension in an
educational program that calls for more local autonomy and a nation-
ally mandated curriculum.
One serious difficulty encountered by education policymakers is the
lack of complete research data to assess similar reform plans used
elsewhere.39 Most plans to restructure schools have been implemented
30. Id.
31. Id. at 87.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Firestone, supra note 4, at 353-58.
36. Id.
37. Boyd, supra note 27, at 88.
38. Robert S. Boyd, Bush Plans "Revolution in Education," TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT,
Apr. 19, 1991, at Al.
39. GEORGE J. PAPPAGIANNIS ET AL., A REvIEw AND ANALYSIS OF RECENT EFFORTS IN RE-
STRUCTURING EDUCATIONAL GovERNANCE: MAJOR ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL
POLICY 9, 45 (1991); see McDONNELL & ELMORE, supra note 26, at v (discussing difficulties of
comparative education research).
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only recently, and pertinent information is often tentative and anec-
dotal, or worse, promotional.4 Policymakers must realize that the re-
structuring process requires a long-term-often incrementally
phased-commitment to a plan. 4' Promises of quick, dramatic im-
provements tend to be counter-productive.42
II. EDUCATION REFORM IN OTHER STATES: SuccEssFUL BUT...
A. South Carolina
South Carolina has passed two major pieces of accountability legis-
lation since 1984 that place the state among the nation's leaders in
education reform strategies. 43 With the Education Improvement Act
(EIA) of 1984, South Carolina implemented a number of Wave One
reforms. For example, EIA toughened academic standards; increased
attention given to the needs of gifted, disadvantaged, and vocational
students; improved monitoring and funding of basic skills programs;
and allocated substantial new revenues to education. 4 The EIA Wave
One reforms represented one of the first comprehensive pieces of
statewide school reform legislation in the nation.45
Responding to initial assessments of the effectiveness of EIA re-
forms, the South Carolina Legislature in 1989 enacted Target 2000-
School Reform For The Next Decade.46 Target 2000 mandated certain
educational programs studied as part of EIA.47 In addition, the Act
granted districts and local schools greater autonomy and flexibility to
improve student performance. 48 While the Act stated an intent to re-
double earlier efforts at reducing the number of dropouts and stu-
dents with basic skills deficiencies, its primary academic provisions
focused on measuring and rewarding the teaching of higher-order
thinking skills. 49 This shift in objectives is typical of Wave Two initia-
tives that generally acknowledge that excessive emphasis on basic
skills tends to limit excellence in those skills. 50
40. PAPPAGIANNIS, supra note 39, at 9, 45.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. S.C. STATE BD. OF EDUC., WHAT IS THE PENNY BUYING FOR SOUTH CAROLINA? 2 (1990)
[hereinafter PENNY].
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2, 63. Indications of high dropout rates, insufficient higher-order thinking skills,
and small declines in skills test scores (after four years of substantial gains) prompted more
action. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-18-31, -11 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
50. See N.J. DEP'T OF EDUC., TuRNING, THE TiDE: A PROGRESS REPORT ON PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION 18 (1990) [hereinafter TIDE].
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Target 2000 also created new incentives for restructuring" In addi-
tion to exempting schools from complying with certain state regula-
tions, Target 2000 started a grant program to encourage ideas that
fundamentally redefine the way schools operate. 2 Although any
school can compete for grant money, only schools meeting specified
performance goals qualify for the exemptions from state require-
ments. A school becomes eligible for a grant if it registers an above-
average gain on a specific performance index in one of the preceding
three years." Target 2000 also expanded South Carolina's EIA pro-
gram to include new school responsibilities in the areas of dropout
prevention and thinking skills improvement.5 4
1. Incentive System
South Carolina's Target 2000 incentive program measures perform-
ance in three areas: student achievements in math and reading, teacher
attendance, and student attendance. 5 All students are tested each
year.5 6 Individual gains and declines are compared to those of students
in the same grade who scored about the same in the previous year.
Scores above or below the previous year's level result in proportionate
increases or decreases in a School's Gain Index (SGI).5 7 Each school's
SGI is compared to the SGIs of other similarly situated schools with
the top performing schools in each grouping earning monetary re-
wards ."
South Carolina's incentive scheme balances concerns about fairness
and accuracy within a plan that fosters healthy competition designed
to improve performance. 9 The plan ensures accuracy by testing every
student each year and comparing each student's score changes to
changes observed in similarly situated students 0 This permits a rea-
sonable degree of direct comparison of the effectiveness of each
school's efforts. To place similarly situated parties in fair competition
51. See S.C. CoDE ANN. § 59-18-15 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
52. Id. at §§ 59-18-15, -20 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
53. Id. at § 59-18-20 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
54. Id.
55. Bruce Goldberg, Am. Fed'n of Teachers Ctr. for Restructuring, Incentives, 2 RADIUS 3
(Mar./Apr. 1990); see also FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., SUoMAY OF STATE INCENTIVE PLANs 1 (1990).
56. Goldberg, supra note 55; at 3.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 8-9.
59. See generally id. (discussing the importance of fairness and accuracy).
60. Id.
19921 1151
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for the rewards, the plan relies on school comparison bands to adjust
for expected performance differences related to each school's socio-
economic status.6!
South Carolina's educational reforms also include sanctions for
schools experiencing persistent goal-related deficiencies. 2 The state,
however, does not base its sanctions on the same set of indicators used
to award incentive bonuses.63 When a district fails to meet mandated
standards and fails to improve to acceptable levels, the Department of
Education may declare the district seriously impaired. 4 Although an
impaired district receives technical and financial assistance, the local
superintendent is subject to removal and the district may have funds
withheld.65 Since 1984, ten districts have been declared seriously im-
paired, but further sanctions have not been necessary."
2. Results: Improved Student Performance?
In December 1990, the South Carolina Board of Education's Divi-
sion of Public Accountability released an extensive report that chroni-
cled the changes in education since the passage of the EIA.6 7 The
report combined data about student performance with information
gleaned from parent, general public, teacher, and school administra-
tor opinion surveys about school improvement." Although it provided
evidence of initial academic progress, the report indicated a recent
trend toward stagnation or mild decline.6 9
South Carolina's students have significantly improved standardized
test scores since 1984, with only small losses in some areas.70 Basic
Skills Assessment Program (BSAP) results have improved in all sub-
ject areas for all grades tested since 1984. Within six years the percen-
tages of students meeting the skills standards for reading, math, and
writing had risen by 5.7% in grade-six writing and grade-three math
and 18.7% in grade-eight math. 1 There were, however, slight declines
in other subjects.7 2
61. Id.
62. Id. at 9-10.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id. at 9-10.
66. FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., SUMMARY OF STATE INCENTIVE PLANS 2 (1990); PENNY, supra
note 43, at 25.
67. PENNY, supra note 43 (data in this document does not cover the time period since the
enactment of Target 2000).
68. Id. at v.
69. Id. at 63.
70. Id. at vi.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id. (In 1990, the first year of BSAP science testing, standards were met by only 57.5%,
46.7%, and 46% of third, sixth, and eighth graders, respectively.).
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About 63%7o of all students in the class of 1990, the first graduating
class officially subjected to South Carolina's Exit Examination, had
passed the exam by their sophomore year (the first of four available
opportunities), and a total of 9570 passed the test by the end of the
fourth attemptt. 73 This test serves as a final effort to ensure that hold-
ers of South Carolina high school diplomas meet certain minimal aca-
demic standards. 74
In the nationally normed Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills
(CTBS), 75 South Carolina's students have shown significant, across-
the-board improvement since 1984.76 In 1990 students scored higher
than the 1981 national norm group in all but two categories. 77 The
number of composite CTBS scores above the national median for
fourth-, fifth-, seventh-, ninth-, and eleventh-grade students has in-
creased by between 5%Vo and 15%V0 since the mid-1980s but has re-
mained virtually constant between 1989 and 1990.78
South Carolina measures first-grade readiness through the Cogni-
tive Skills Assessment Battery (CSAB).79 From 1984 to 1989, the per-
centage of preschoolers considered ready for first grade rose from
72.4% to 74.4% with 1987 marking the high-water point at 75.2%.80
Unfortunately, the CSAB showed a lack of substantial readiness pro-
gress and persistently large race and socio-economic differences.,
The SAT is South Carolina's primary college entrance examina-
tion.82 Although the average South Carolina student scored sixty-six
points below the 900-point national average in 1989-90, this repre-
sented a thirty-one-point increase since 1984.83 In contrast, the nation
as a whole increased by only three points in the same time period.14
South Carolina's average score dropped by four points in 1990,
closely paralleling the national decline of three points. 5
73. Id. at 12.
74. Id. at 13.
75. Id. at 8. In 1990, South Carolina abandoned the CTBS test in favor of the Stanford-8
Series because it needed a more recently normed test that reflected its current goals more accu-
rately. Scores from the 1990 Stanford test fell consistently below the national median, generally
between 42% and 47%. Id. at 10-11.
76. Id. at 8 (Only ninth- and eleventh-grade reading scores fell below national norms.).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
11531992]
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In contrast to indicators showing substantial progress in the devel-
opment of basic skills are the relatively constant dropout and holding
power rates observed since the EIA's inception. "Holding power" re-
fers to the percentage of ninth-grade students in a given year who
graduate with their class four years later.86 The 1989 dropout rate of
4.2% was the same as the previous year's rate, and holding power
during that same year was 66.3%, the same rate noted in 1986.17 Mi-
nority holding power statistics ran a few percentage points behind the
rate for all students in 1989.88 As a result of the constancy of these
dropout rates, the South Carolina Legislature included provisions in
Target 2000 aimed directly at reducing the dropout rates.89
Teacher and student attendance, two of the original criteria for the
school incentive plan, have remained relatively stable over the years
with some improvement in each area.90 In 1985, student absences
dropped by an average of almost three days per year (from 9.5 days to
6.8 days), but since that time they have fluctuated between 7.2 and 7.7
days.9 1 Teachers missed an average of 6.5 days per year in 1989 and
1990, down from 7.0 days in 1984.92 The state's student attendance
rates throughout this time have ranked among the nation's best.93
B. New Jersey
New Jersey embarked on its comprehensive, Wave One reform
strategy in 1982, a year before A Nation at Risk warned Americans of
the education crisis. 94 The state established higher standards for stu-
dents, teachers, and educational leaders to reform its schools in a uni-
fied, consistent way. New Jersey did not alter its input-oriented
system of compliance monitoring with respect to the district certifica-
tion process.9 5 Instead, the state sought improved academic results by
mandating higher expectations for all involved and backed the new
demands with programs designed to help those having difficulty meet-
ing them. 96 More importantly, New Jersey bore the financial burdens
86. Id.
87. Id. at 16.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 17, 28.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 28.
93. Id. at 17 (South Carolina led the nation in 1984-1985 and 1985-1986. In 1988-1989, the
state ranked seventh in the nation and moved to second for the 1989-1990 school year.).
94. TreE, supra note 50, at i.
95. Id.
96. Id. (New Jersey has enacted 40 major initiatives since 1982, each designed to require or
encourage improvement or help those having difficulties meeting the new standards.).
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associated with its reform programs, 97 rather than simply mandating
excellence without providing assistance. New Jersey's reform efforts
are regarded by many educators as being among the most impressive
and comprehensive in the nation. 9
1. Tougher Standards and Targeted Programs
New Jersey's reforms have been driven by the traditional, Wave
One notion that creating higher expectations, testing to see that they
are attained, and providing the money and help needed to meet those
expectations is the best way to promote academic excellence.9 The
state invested substantial money in its reform efforts, nearly doubling
its total education spending from 1982 to 1989 and making it the high-
est ranked state in per-pupil expenditures by the 1988-1989 school
year.100
In 1983, New Jersey discontinued the Minimum Basic Skills (MBS)
test, passage of which had become a high school graduation require-
ment in 1982.101 The test measured mastery of sixth-grade skills, and
state education leaders were concerned that MBS would be used as a
yardstick of success. 102 The state replaced it with the High School Pro-
ficiency Test (HSPT), which measures proficiency in ninth-grade skills
in reading, writing (including an essay), and math (including multiple-
step problem solving).0 3 The HSPT became a graduation requirement
in 1986, and passage was necessary beginning with the class of 1989.104
The test is first given to ninth-grade students, followed by remediation
97. Id. at 48.
98. Id.
99. See generally TIDE, supra note 50, at ii, 15-16, 49. Since 1982 New Jersey has raised
graduation credit requirements; increased the complexity of its mandatory graduation examina-
tion virtually to grade level; created job training and placement programs in urban areas; devel-
oped dropout prevention and assistance programs; instituted limited school choice options for
specific groups of students; sought out better qualified teachers by providing loan incentives and
higher salaries; enacted many teacher recognition programs to encourage outstanding and inno-
vative teaching; emphasized bilingual, special, and remedial education programs by providing
substantial funding increases; implemented pilot prekindergarten education and social service
programs in three urban areas; toughened the processes of teacher certification, while providing
access to the profession for a wide variety of noneducation majors with high levels of subject
area expertise; and created a series of core course proficiencies and a plan to begin testing for
these skills, which includes a district takeover option when state officials find the districts are not
doing their jobs correctly.
100. Id. at 48 (Spending for bilingual programs tripled to more than $34 million in 1989;
basic skills improvement funding more than doubled, rising from $60 million to $155 million a
year; state aid to urban districts jumped from $656 million to $1.2 billion per year.).
101. Id. at 16.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 16-17.
104. Id.
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if needed, with subsequent administrations throughout the high school
years for those students who do not pass all sections. 05 The state also
created a comprehensive plan-targeted primarily at urban districts-
to help students who do not pass the exam in the ninth-grade.1° Man-
dating tougher tests and standards is not enough, however, programs
must be established to give all students a decent chance to achieve
those standards.0 7
As educators expected, HSPT scores closely tracked the socio-eco-
nomic status of students. New Jersey has monitored test results ac-
cording to a socio-economic classification by district. Each district is
given a ranking of "A" through "J," with A representing the poorest
districts and J the wealthiest. In 1990, 99.8% of all district J students
passed the reading section, while 91.6% passed in districts labelled
A. 108
Regardless of what specific programs and circumstances have
caused these test score gains, 1°9 it seems New Jersey's students have
responded to the challenge of higher expectations by striving to meet
them. State leaders are so convinced that expectations drive results
that they now plan to create an eleventh-grade HSPT that will meas-
ure attainment of those skills all high school graduates should have."10
In keeping with its earlier strategy, New Jersey plans to adapt its ex-
105. Id.; see also N.J. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SuMMARY GRADE-9 at 5 (1990) (In 1990,
84.4% of all ninth graders passed all three portions of the test, up from 83.8% the previous
year. Mean scores in reading rose from 77.3 in 1984 to 94.1 in 1990, while the percentage of
students passing increased from 66.4% to 97.9%. Mathematics mean scores moved from 62.6 in
1984 to 80.8 in 1990, while passage rates soared from 53.6% in 1984 to 88.1% in 1990. Writing
section composite mean scores went from 80.0 in 1985 to 87.8 in 1990, and passage rates climbed
from 66.7% to 94.8%.).
106. TiDE, supra note 50, at 16-17.
107. See McDoNNELL & ELMORE, supra note 26, at 9.
108. Id. (table 4). Mean reading scores for district A students rose from 63.9 to 89.0 between
1984 and 1990, compared with a rise from 86.4 to 97.1 for district J students during the same
period (the passing score for the reading section is 75). In math, for which the passing score is
61, district A students had mean scores of 48.2 in 1984 and 70.3 in 1990, with a 1990 passage
rate of 68.5%, while district J students had mean scores of 75.3 in 1984 and 88.6 in 1990, with a
1990 passage rate of 97.6%. Results in the writing section displayed a similar pattern with dis-
trict A mean scores rising from 72.8 in 1985 to 83.2 in 1990, for an 82.8% 1990 passage rate,
while district J mean scores of 86.5 and 90.8 respectively, with a 1990 passage rate of 99.2%.
Initial district A deficits have been narrowed substantially over the monitored period even as all
groups have improved their mean scores and passage rates. Id.
109. See Bruce L. Wilson & H. Dickson Corbett, Statewide Testing and Local Improvement:
An Oxymoron, in Tan EDUCATION REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE 1980s: PERSPECTIVE AND CASES
243, 261 (Joseph Murphy ed., 1990) (suggesting that teaching to a specific test can induce im-
proved scores that often are irrelevant to overall academic quality and at times even harmful to
it).
110. TIDE, supra note 50, at 17 (Passing this new test will be a graduation requirement by
1995.).
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tensive remedial and training programs to help students and teachers
meet the new demands."' The state will also administer an "early
warning" test to eighth-grade students to identify those expected to
have future problems and begin the process of remediation." 2
New Jersey intends to ensure a quality education to all its students
by developing statewide core course proficiencies for common high
school courses.1 3 The state will monitor attainment of these proficien-
cies through tests scheduled to begin in 1992. 4 The results will be
used by the state and by schools to diagnose academic problems and
direct improvement efforts." 5 Districts will not be told how to teach
the curriculum, but the state will specify what high school students
should derive from typical course offerings in English, science, social
studies, mathematics, and foreign language." 6
One might expect New Jersey to have an unusually serious dropout
problem as a consequence of tougher graduation tests and substantial
increases in the required number of credits.' '7 Interestingly, the state-
wide dropout rate of 16.1% recently ranked New Jersey among the
quarter of states having the lowest percentage of dropouts." 8 State of-
ficials acknowledge that more action is needed to further reduce drop-
out rates, especially in some urban pockets of higher rates, but the
extensive investments in preventive and remedial programs seem to
have mitigated a good deal of the initial impact of higher standards." 9
New Jersey's more recently developed dropout programs, together
with its continued commitment to those students needing assistance,
should help reduce the state's urban dropout rate. °20
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 18-19.
116. Id. at 19.
117. Id. at 18 (New Jersey now requires 110 academic credits for graduation, compared to 92
in 1982, an increase of nearly 20%.).
118. Id. at 36.
Dropout rates and holding power seem to vary with each statistical indicator, even within the
same state for the same time period. Student attrition factors (fundamental to the definition of a
dropout) can be calculated in different ways causing different outcomes. Holding power statis-
tics depend on who is included in beginning and ending groups, as well as the period of time
used in the computation. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
DROP-OuT RAms IN THE UNITEI STATES: 1989 (1990).
119. TimE, supra note 50, at 36.
120. Id. at 37. In addition to the indirect impact of prekindergarten programs targeting the
urban poor, New Jersey is training and finding jobs for urban youth in return for a promise that
they will stay in school, providing special General Education Diploma training for past dropouts
in its urban areas, and providing programs to encourage recent dropouts to return to a school
that suits them. Id.
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2. Changes in School Monitoring System
On January 16, 1991, Governor Jim Florio signed into law a strict
school monitoring (accountability) law, revising the prior system.'2'
The law reduced administrative hassles for successful districts,
prompted quicker state intervention into problem district operations,
and revised the monitoring standards to include evaluation of pupil
performance in all areas of the core curriculum.'2
Before 1983, the state certified schools each year using a cumber-
some 300-item checklist that placed little emphasis on planning.' 23 Re-
visions in the law at that time narrowed the evaluation to forty-three
indicators within ten basic areas of operation.'2 To be performed
once every five years, the evaluation had only one measure of student
performance: basic skills. 25 In 1988, the Legislature allowed the state
to take over the operation of any school district that repeatedly failed
to correct serious deficiencies discovered during the monitoring proc-
ess. 26 In October 1989, the state took over the Jersey City public
schools after more than a year of court battles. 27 The new law does
not change the state's takeover power except to the extent that it
streamlines the necessary levels of review, making quicker state inter-
vention possible when necessary.2
III. THE NEED FOR REFORM IN FLORIDA
Florida's schools have not been immune from the educational diffi-
culties faced by New Jersey, South Carolina, and the rest of the na-
tion. Florida was among the thirty-seven states that participated in the
1990 national mathematics test.' 29 Eighth-graders demonstrated below
average skills and ranked near the bottom, along with students from
sixteen other states with scores in a similar range.3 0
From 1986 to 1990, Florida's average verbal SAT score dropped
five points to 418, while the national average declined six points to
424 during the same period.'' Average scores in mathematics dropped
121. Office of the Gov., News Release (N.J. Jan. 16, 1991) [hereinafter Release].
122. See id.
123. TIE, supra note 50, at 44.
124. Id.
125. Id.; see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 8-4.1 (1990); see generally N.J. DEP'T OF
EDUC., MANUAL FOR THE EVALUATION OF LOCAL DISTRICTS PURSUANT TO THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
EDUCATION ACT OF 1975 (1987).
126. N.J. STAT. AN. § 18A:7A-34 (West 1990).
127. TIDE, supra note 50, at 45.
128. See generally Release, supra note 121.
129. Math Skills Don't Add Up, TALLAHASSEE DEmOCRAT, June 7, 1991, at A10.
130. Id.
131. LEON CounTY FLA. SCH. BD., ANN. REP. 1989-19904.
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four points to 466, while national scores stayed constant at 476 for the
same period.3 2 During the past twelve years, the percentage of minor-
ity students taking the SAT increased 89%, from 8.7% to 11.8% of
all takers, while minorities' average scores improved by 68 points.'33
The SAT test is the most commonly taken college entrance examina-
tion in Florida.134
Florida's total school enrollment (prekindergarten through twelfth
grade) increased more than 15% between fall 1985 and fall 1991, from
1,562,283 to 1,861,592.115 The impact of such growth on education
quality can create serious difficulties, especially during a period of re-
cession and budget cuts like the one Florida is now experiencing.
A. Road to Reform Legislation
To improve the Florida educational system, a broad majority of the
members in the Florida House of Representatives preferred a plan
that would allow more district and local school decision making. 35
Senate leaders, especially Senate President Gwen Margolis, argued
that the House sought too much change too quickly without seriously
studying the need of local schools to be free of program mandates
from Tallahassee.'3 7 The Senate, therefore, sought to slow down the
reform process and keep educational control in the hands of the Leg-
islature. 13 8
1. The Florida House of Representatives
In keeping with Governor Lawton Chiles' "right-sizing" strategy of
shifting decision making power closer to those who actually deliver
services,'3 9 Commissioner of Education Betty Castor championed a
bold plan to repeal or make optional many of Florida's legislative ed-
ucation mandates.14' The Commissioner wanted to allow individual
schools and school districts to make more of the decisions about how
132. Id.
133. MARTHA J. MILLER, FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., INFORMATION ON SAT AND ACT SCORES 2
(1991).
134. Id. at 1 (Forty-six percent of Florida high school graduates take the SAT; 30% take the
American College Test.).
135. FLA. DEP'T OF EDUc., EDUC. INFO. SERvs., MIS STATISTICAL BRIEF 1.
136. Accountability Bill Will Go to the Senate, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 4, 1991, at
B5.
137. Dave Bruns, School Plan Put on Hold, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 11, 1991, at B4.
138. Margolis Expresses Leeriness, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 27, 1991, at BI.
139. Bill Mansfield, It's Time to Liberate the Schools, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Feb. 17,
1991, at B2.
140. Id.
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children get educated because "teachers, local administrators and
school board members know what the state wants-it is, after all, the
same thing they want-and that it's time to give them a chance to
show what they can do with a few less fetters."' 41
The House Committee on Public Schools sought to do just that
when its members overwhelmingly approved the School Improvement
and Education Accountability Bill for further consideration.142 Gener-
ally, the bill created a formal decentralization process that provided
local schools and districts with alternatives to many state-mandated
programs and outlined broad goals that were to serve as the underly-
ing criteria for measuring school performance. Before passing the bill,
the full House endorsed several amendments and rejected several oth-
ers. 143
Proponents of extensive decentralization seemed to act upon a gut-
level instinct that locally generated curricula and spending decisions
would be more effective and efficient than Tallahassee mandates
mired in bureaucratic guidelines and compliance reports.',, Expressing
concern that the Senate might ruin the bill by limiting its scope, Gov-
ernor Chiles issued a plea for substantive change: "I think the one
thing we're concerned about is that we lock in that these things are
going to happen. Unless we do, say, lock in a process that you're
starting down this road, then we really have not passed anything but
another study commission." 45
141. Id.
142. The House Public Schools Committee approved House Bill 2343 by a 16 to 3 vote on
March 11, 1991, sending it to the House Appropriations Committee for further analysis. Appro-
priations approved Committee Substitute for House Bill 2343 on March 21, 1991, by a 27 to 9
vote, but deleted suggested sanctions for noncompliant schools and added a requirement for the
districts to submit reports to provide feedback. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Pub. Schs., CS for
HB 2343 (1991) Staff Analysis 1 (Mar. 22, 1991) (on file with comm.); House Committee OKs
Accountability, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Mar. 22, 1991, at C4; Committee: Give Schools Lee-
way, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Mar. 12, 1991, at D4.
143. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 304-06 (Reg. Sess. 1991). The amendment debates and votes were sig-
nificant. First, House members showed a strong commitment to keeping the bill clean conceptu-
ally, despite some impassioned arguments to continue several mandates. Second, the House
rejected an amendment by Representative Tom Feeney, Republican, Orlando, calling for a pilot
voucher (choice) program that would allow poor, at-risk students attending schools not meeting
state goals to change schools. Third, amendment four to the bill gave the Commissioner of
Education authority to reorganize the Department of Education to foster a stringent education
accountability system. House adoption of amendment four indicated an awareness of the new
and difficult role of the Department in the accountability process. The House adopted the bill by
a 95 to 20 vote on April 3, 1991. See id.; Accountability Bill Will Go to the Senate, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Apr. 4, 1991, at B5.
144. See Education: Freedom with Accountability, TALLAHASsEE DEMOCRAT, Mar. 3, 1991,
at B2; PAPPAGIANNIS, supra note 39, at 79.
145. Accountability Plan Faces Full House Vote, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Mar. 28, 1991, at
B4.
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2. Senate Questions Aspects of Accountability
The Governor's plea went unheeded. On the same day the House
approved House Bill 2343, the Senate Education Committee voted to
push its own version of accountability legislation, Senate Bills 2054
and 1504.146 In comparison with House Bill 2343, the Senate bills did
not provide local educators with as much flexibility, they slowed down
the accountability process, and they preserved the Legislature's ulti-
mate authority over school operations in Florida. 147
In contrast to the optimism about reform shown by the House lead-
ers, the Senate and its leadership expressed concerns about the effect
of decentralization on Florida's schools. 48 Senate President Margolis,
charging that no one really understood how the accountability bill
would change schools, stated: "Whatever we'd do would affect school
kids for the next decade. That needs more than a couple of hours of
committee study." 149
As a result, the Senate unanimously passed a "watered-down" ver-
sion of the House bill. 50 Commissioner Castor called the Senate bill
"totally unacceptable."'' House members also rejected the Senate
proposal, and a conference committee was created to seek an accepta-
ble compromise bill. 52 After a dizzying period of wrangling, marked
by cycles of rising expectations and dashed hopes, the Legislature
passed the Blueprint 2000 education reform bill at the eleventh
hour.'
146. The Senate Education Committee voted six to three in favor of passing a substitute bill,
which combined elements of accountability bills presented by Senators Sherry D. Walker, Demo-
crat, Waukeenah, and Winston W. "Bud" Gardner, Jr., Democrat, Titusville (Senate Bills 1504
and 2054, respectively). Interview with Ann Levy, Legis. Analyst for Comm. on Pub. Schs., in
Tallahassee, Fla. (Apr. 5, 1991) (notes on file, Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee,
Fla.).
147. The Senate Bill consistently called for reports from the oversight bodies it created, but it
included no language that would have mandated specific changes in local responsibilities or
guidelines for specific types of legislative action in the future. See generally Comparison of Ac-
countability Bills-1991 (unpublished document on file with S. Educ. Comm.).
148. Dave Bruns, School Plan Put on Hold, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 11, 1991, at B4.
149. Id.
150. Dave Bruns, School Proposal Passes, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 19, 1991, at C4.
151. Id. (The Senate Bill created an interim period for assessments of school needs, followed
by longer-term efforts to devise an accountability process.).
152. Id.
153. The final days of the session are chronicled in the following articles: Jackie Hallifax,
House Passes Accountability, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, May 2, 1991, at B5; Accountability has
Tough Row to Hoe, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 30, 1991, at D5; Dave Burns, MacKay:
Agree or Return, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 27, 1991, at B4; Accountability Deal Stalls,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 25, 1991, at D6; Dave Burns, Still No Deal on School Bill, TAL-
LAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 24, 1991, at C4.
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B. Key Features of Blueprint 2000
Although it resulted from a compromise, Blueprint 2000 included
most of the elements of the House package with an initial one-year
period devoted to needs assessment and needs responses. 5 4 During
that period, the law requires the newly created Commission on Educa-
tion Reform and Accountability to submit recommendations to the
Legislature and State Board of Education on many difficult and con-
troversial issues, such as performance objectives and measurement de-
vices; incentives and sanctions based on performance data; identifying
laws needing revision, repeal, or optional waiver to facilitate reform;
and plans to reorganize the Department of Education.' Blueprint
2000 outlines broad educational goals to guide policy decisions 56 and
recognizes the school board as the body responsible for student per-
formance, while making the school the unit for accountability. 5 7 It
also emphasizes the need to set clear goals, measure performance, and
reward success while dealing effectively with failure.'58
The primary long-term vehicle of school accountability is the school
improvement plan in which each school will confront its deficiencies
and devise goals and strategies to overcome them.'5 9 Schools must
submit such plans to their districts for approval and implementation
in the 1993-1994 school year. 16 In the meantime, the Commission on
Education Reform and Accountability is charged with recommending
performance goals, measurement strategies, reward and enforcement
plans, and various reporting standards. 6' These guidelines will eventu-
ally drive the system, and districts will be held accountable for attain-
ing state and local goals. 62
Under Blueprint 2000, schools and districts have the potential to
gain autonomy. For example, certain education laws are to be held in
154. Lawmakers Pass Power to Parents and Teachers, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, May 3,
1991, at Cl.
155. See FLA. STAT § 229.594 (1991).
156. See FLA. STAT. § 229.591(3) (1991) (The goals are: a) improved student readiness to start
school; b) higher graduation rates with graduates who are prepared for further education and the
world of employment; c) student performance at the highest levels of national and international
competitiveness, including an ability to deal with important life decisions; d) a learning environ-
ment conducive to high academic achievement; e) safe, drug-free schools that protect students'
civil rights as well; f) a high level of teacher and staff professionalism; and g) maximum adult
literacy.).
157. Id. at § 229.591(1) (1991).
158. Id. at § 229.591(2) (1991).
159. Id. at § 229.592(1) (1991).
160. Id. (containing a requirement for the initial needs assessments and an outline of what
each should contain).
161. Id. at § 229.593-.594 (1991).
162. Id.
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abeyance if no line-item appropriation funds the programs in the Gen-
eral Appropriations Acts of 1991, 1992, and 1993.163 This provision
allows schools to implement their own programs (or none at all, where
appropriate) to deal with concerns previously addressed by legislative
mandates. Even where specific line-item appropriations exist, school
boards may get waivers from the Commissioner of Education upon
written request and a showing that the requesting authority meets the
general purpose of the section to be waived.64 The Commissioner has
the authority to waive Board of Education rules created to implement
education laws that are to be held in abeyance.' 65 The Commissioner
of Education also will make recommendations to the Legislature for
the repeal or revision of laws found to be impediments to school im-
provement and for enactment of new laws required to further the
processes of accountability and improvement. 66
C. Steps Already Taken
Implementing Blueprint 2000 has already begun and several dead-
lines have been met. The Commission has held public meetings in lo-
cations throughout the state to hear community concerns and ideas.'6 7
Michael Biance,' 68 the executive director of the Commission, has cre-
ated committees charged with developing, by June 1, 1992, perform-
ance standards, assessment and reporting methods, and adequate
progress criteria in each of the seven broad goal areas.' 69 The Depart-
163. Id. at § 229.592(6)(a) (1991) (statutes to be in abeyance: §§ 228.071 (community educa-
tion); 228.0855 (model schools); 230.2215 (school board member professional development);
230.2305 (early intervention); 230.2312 (primary education); 230.2313 (student services);
230.2314 (teachers as advisers); 230.2316(11)-(13) (dropout prevention-three special program
grants); 230.2318 (resource officers); 230.2319(6)-(9) (middle childhood grant programs);
231.087 (management training); 231.613 (inservice training); 232.257 (school safety); 233.057
(reading programs); 233.067(5)-(8) (portions of health education and substance abuse program);
234.021 (hazardous walking conditions); 236.02(3) (seven period day); 236.0835 (bus replace-
ment); 236.0873 (school volunteers); 236.083 (transportation funds); 236.088 (basic skills supple-
ment); 236.091 (programs of excellence); 236.092 (laboratories); 236.122 (materials); 236.1223
(writing skills); 236.1224 (science); 236.1228 (accountability program grants)).
164. Id. at § 229.592(6)(b) (1991).
165. Id. at § 229.592(6)(c) (1991).
166. Id. at § 229.594(1) (1991).
167. Telephone interview with Ann Levy, Legis. Analyst for Comm. on Pub. Schs., in Talla-
hassee, Fla. (Jan. 3, 1992) (notes on file, Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee,
Fla.).
168. Mr. Biance has experience as a teacher, principal, and most recently as the Associate
Superintendent of Schools for Highlands County. Interview with Ann Levy, Legis. Analyst for
Comm. on Pub. Schs., in Tallahassee, Fla. (Aug. 2, 1991) (notes on file, Fla. Dep't of State,
Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
169. Rather than devising separate standards, assessment, and progress criteria committees,
Biance used the broad goal areas as the foundation for the groupings. This means that each
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ment of Education has compiled district-by-district reports and an ex-
ecutive summary, based upon data contained in the needs assessments
and needs response plans received from each school in the state. These
will be used by the Commission and Legislature to formulate new pro-
grams and policies related to the accountability process. 70
Despite this initial flurry of positive organizational activity, Blue-
print 2000 now approaches its most fragile stage of development.
Within the next year, the Commission and the Legislature must act to
flesh out the statutory skeleton by adopting more specific goals and
assessment techniques, determining the consequences for outstanding
or deficient performance, and deciding how much regulatory freedom
districts and schools will have. ' 71
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Those making critical policy decisions must be mindful of the need
to use a broad mix of accountability strategies to enhance prospects
for success. 72 Blueprint 2000 includes references that clearly call for
the use of four of Kirst's six approaches.'
Florida's educational reform plan focuses primarily on accountabil-
ity through better performance reporting. Thus, the performance
standard/assessment development committees must provide specific
goals that truly reflect the kind of academic excellence Florida desires.
The vague, but central, goal of reaching the highest levels of interna-
tional competitiveness needs to be expressed in terms of a series of
achievable, measurable skills. All else in the entire process hinges on
committee will look at the entire process with respect to its goal area. The Executive Director
believes this approach will bring about more consistent, workable recommendations. Telephone
interview with Michael Biance, Executive Director, Fla. Comm'n on Educ. Reform and Ac-
countability, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Jan. 3, 1992) (notes on file, Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Ar-
chives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
170. Interview with Judy Meyer, Adm'r, Pub. Schs. Office of Program Excellence and Rec-
ognition Services, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Jan. 3, 1992) (notes on file, Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of
Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
171. See FLA. STAT. § 229.591 (1991).
172. See KIRST, supra note 2, at 1.
173. See NATION AT RISK, supra note 10, at 5.
Blueprint 2000 focuses on better reporting of educational improvements and on shifts of con-
trol to local districts and individual schools. Compliance with many state-mandated standards
will still be monitored. The law anticipates the use of incentives and sanctions to promote ac-
countability, but it does not devise a specific incentive plan. If future actions lead to more au-
tonomous School Advisory Councils, teachers, administrators, and parents may take on
different roles in the process of school governance. Such changes would promote market force
and professional role alteration strategies as well. The Commission and Legislature should also
give serious consideration to targeted market options, such as the amendment offered by Repre-
sentative Feeney as a stimulus to overcome specific, observed performance lag or inequity. See
FLA. H.R. JOUR. 304-06 (Reg. Sess. 1991); supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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the ability to create such goals and measure levels of achievement as-
sociated with them. No amount of time, effort, or money should be
spared with respect to this task. Politically, meeting the upcoming
deadlines is important, but educationally, getting the goals and assess-
ments right is far more critical.
Five years after launching its extensive basic skills and attendance
oriented accountability plan, South Carolina realized that it could not
sustain academic progress (or indeed, retain the progress made during
those years) without setting goals for higher-order thinking skills. 74
Florida's policymakers should closely review South Carolina's early
work in this area and should steadfastly refuse to accept performance
goals that sound like rehashed minimum skills. Overreliance on stan-
dardized, bubble sheet assessment tools must also be resisted because
such tests have limited capacities to measure more complicated skill
applications and decision-making processes. 175 After all, if assessments
are not done right, incentives will lead to the wrong results. 76 Assum-
ing the commission can accomplish this difficult task quickly and rea-
sonably, policy makers will be faced with important decisions about
the best method to ensure widespread goal achievement. Currently,
Blueprint 2000 provides a small amount of regulatory flexibility (abey-
ance and waiver lists), requires every school to submit an improve-
ment plan, and creates an improvement plan compliance process that
includes no specific rewards or sanctions. 177 Something more will be
needed.
Here again, Florida should review the incentive/sanction strategies
used in other state accountability systems and adapt them to its own
needs and resources. The state systems discussed in this Comment use
"carrot and stick" approaches, each featuring a different combina-
tion of rewards and penalties. Incentive systems can be driven by
pledges of money and increased autonomy for high achievement and
significant gains.178 Considering the current fiscal crisis, Florida's poli-
cymakers may need to rely more heavily on the autonomy incentive,
but there should also be monetary rewards, and they must not be triv-
174. See PENNY, supra note 43, at 64.
175. Wilson & Corbett, supra note 109, at 244.
176. Albert Shanker, A Proposal for Using Incentives to Restructure Our Public Schools,
PHi DELTA KAPPAN 355 (Jan. 1990).
177. See FLA. STAT. §§ 229.592(6)(a)-(b) (1991).
178. New Jersey offers freedom from the accreditation process to qualifying schools, but the
state can take over any district that persistently fails to meet state requirements; South Carolina
offers money and regulatory flexibility to achievers, but it can withhold funding and remove the
district superintendent when minimum accreditation criteria are not met after assistance has been
rendered. Goldberg, supra note 55, at 6-10.
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ial in nature. A combined incentive system promotes two accountabil-
ity strategies: accountability by incentives and accountability by
changes in control with the latter strategy involving structural shifts.
As part of the new incentive plan, Florida needs to develop a pro-
gram of interventions and sanctions to deal with under-achieving
schools and districts. These types of actions should be graduated in
severity, reflecting the seriousness and longevity of the deficiency and
the level of cooperation extended during the initial intervention ef-
forts. The plan approved must include some form of ultimate sanction
(i.e., district takeover, withholding of funds, removal of board mem-
bers and superintendents, and other examples found in the South Car-
olina and New Jersey plans) to encourage better intervention results
and to ensure a minimum level of performance.
Should the Legislature approve a substantial incentive system, it
will send a message to the public and the education community that it
is committed to Blueprint 2000. Based on past education reform expe-
riences, the budget crisis, and serious Senate resistance during the
1991 session, there is sufficient reason to doubt the presence of such
long-term commitment. 79
Consistent with the local autonomy portion of the incentive strat-
egy, waiver applications must be encouraged and the process made
simple. 180 This would extend greater local control to many more
schools (not just high achieving schools).
Finally, Florida must follow New Jersey's lead in making every ef-
fort to see to it that deficient students are not left behind as the ma-
jority moves ahead. As standards are raised, educators and
policymakers need to closely monitor the progress of all groups of
students and take prompt remedial action as difficulties become
known. If the Commission, Legislature, and Department of Educa-
tion work together diligently now to develop and fund a sound ac-
countability system, the state may be able to avoid severe, costly
problems in the future.
Blueprint 2000 at this time is much more than just another study
commission, but it is also far less than the miracle cure reform pack-
179. At the conclusion of the 1992 Regular Session, the Legislature appeared committed to
keeping Blueprint 2000 intact. First, the Legislature followed the recommendations of the Com-
mission and made no major revisions to the 1991 scheme. Telephone interview with Michael
Biance, Executive Director, Fla. Comm'n on Educ. Reform and Accountability, in Tallahassee,
Fla. (Mar. 18, 1992) (notes on file, Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
Second, the Legislature passed a bill that expanded the waiver and abeyance lists found in Blue-
print 2000. Telephone interview with Ann Levy, Legis. Analyst for Comm. on Pub. Schs., in
Tallahassee, Fla. (Mar. 16, 1992) (notes on file, Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahas-
see, Fla.).
180. See FLA. STAT. § 229.592(6)(b) (1991).
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age some hoped it would be. The Legislature must be willing to cede
significant authority to the schools and districts and pay for the new
processes if it really wishes to test Governor Chiles' notion of the su-
periority of local control. Each of the state systems reviewed in this
Comment demonstrated a clear sense of purpose and a long-term
commitment to the reform measures chosen. If Blueprint 2000 is to
live up to its advance billing, Florida must adopt a similar level of
commitment.

